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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
The application of the theory of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) has encountered criticism
since its inception in 1999. However, JCE has become one of the most frequently charged
forms of liability at the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is not
surprising that the newly created Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) would attempt to learn from the
ICTY and utilize this theory of liability.
Unfortunately, as of late, the theory of JCE, specifically the third or “extended” type
(JCE3), has come into conflict with another form of liability, that of command responsibility.
There is in fact a great deal of confusion surrounding these two doctrines and the ways that they
work together or in opposition to each other. Because the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal is
not identical to those of the ICTY, the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the prosecutors and judges of the IHT must chart new
territory in their application of JCE to its defendants.
1

The application of the theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise 3 (JCE 3) to war crimes has elicited a
number of law review articles addressing the issues raised in regards to the theory of command
responsibility. The armed forces of many countries are concerned that JCE 3 renders a
commander responsible for nearly all acts committed by his subordinates (analogous to strict
liability) without those protections afforded by the concept of command responsibility. The Iraqi
High Tribunal Statute Article 15, Fourth, sets forth the concept of command responsibility as
follows; “The crimes that were committed by a subordinate do not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so, and the superior failed to take the necessary and appropriate
measures to prevent such acts or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.” Discuss the relationship between command responsibility and
JCE3. Address specifically the argument that if JCE3 applies then any acts of violence
committed by service members against civilians (such as rape) will be war crimes because such
acts are foreseeable during war. Also address whether the approach of applying JCE3 to war
crimes dictates that commanders will always be war criminals when pursuing a war.
9

The nuances of both command responsibility and JCE have raised questions as to the
guilt or innocence of those leading armed forces in any kind of combat. This memorandum will
discuss the relationship between the theories of command responsibility and type 3 joint criminal
enterprise. It will also address the question of whether or not commanders of armed forces can
be held culpable more easily under JCE3 than under command responsibility.

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Article 15(2)(D) of the Iraqi High Tribunal Statute encompasses Joint
Criminal Enterprise.
Article 15(2)(D) of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IHT”) Statute provides that liability arises
if an individual participates “with a common criminal intention to commit or attempt to commit
such a crime,” provided that “such participation shall be intentional and shall either (1)Be made
for the aim of consolidating the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (2)
Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime 2
It follows from this provision that an individual who in any way contributes to the
commission of a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction can be held criminally responsible and
liable for punishment, even if he does not perpetrate the crime himself. A form of this “common
purpose” liability has been involved in a substantial amount of jurisprudence at the ICTY, ICTR
and SCSL.
Case law from these courts reveals that “common purpose” liability has become
interchangeable with joint criminal enterprise liability, and the evidentiary requirements for the

2

The Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm [reproduced
in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 1].
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doctrine have been set forth and followed in a large number of cases over more than ten years.
Due to the fact that Article 15(2)(D) of the IHT Statute explicitly provides for common purpose
liability (specifying “common criminal intention”), it follows that it also encompasses joint
criminal enterprise.

2. The specific wording of Article 15(2)(D) and its definition of common
purpose liability differs considerably from the ICTY/R and SCSL case law
definitions of Joint Criminal Enterprise.
Article 15(2)(D) of the IHT Statute is identical to Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). However, it differs textually from the provisions used
at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL to impose joint criminal enterprise liability. Article 15 directly
provides for common purpose liability, whereas the other courts have had to interpret common
purpose liability as being implied by their statutes.
As opposed to the other international tribunals who must rely on the judge-made doctrine,
the IHT Statute explicitly spells out the mental states necessary to incur liability for crimes
committed by persons acting with a common purpose. However, the IHT mens rea requirements
are not the same as those set forth in the jurisprudence of the other tribunals.

3. Certain requirements of Article 15(2)(D) seem to exclude the use of JCE3,
and therefore, prosecutors could not rely on the IHT Statute as the basis for
including JCE3 in their indictments
The IHT Statute explicitly requires the accused to know of the group’s intention to
commit a crime in order to be held liable.3 This is a higher mens rea requirement than that
required for JCE by the jurisprudence of the other tribunals. While this higher requirement
seems to continue to allow the IHT to prosecute individuals using the first two categories of JCE
3

IHT Statute, Article 15(2)(D), supra note 2 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 1].
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liability, which will be described later in this memo (section III A 1, notes 22-27 and
accompanying text), it seems to preclude use of the third category, known as the Extended JCE.
When utilizing JCE3, one member of the enterprise need not have known about the other
member’s criminal intent as long as the crimes were foreseeable.

4. Regardless of whether the IHT determines that JCE3 is or is not included
in the text of Article 15, the IHT may opt to utilize JCE3 based on the
jurisprudence of other international courts which have found JCE3 to be
customary international law.

The IHT may choose to apply the jurisprudence of the other international tribunals, which
allow for JCE3, on the grounds that JCE3 reflects general legal principles and customary
international law. By opting to follow the other tribunals’ jurisprudence, rather than being
limited by specifics of its own Statute, the IHT would be choosing to use every means possible to
hold the most blameworthy criminal masterminds liable for atrocities from which they are far
removed. The IHT would also be maintaining consistency between the international criminal
law courts. However, utilizing JCE3 almost certainly deviates from the IHT Statute, which might
give strength to the argument that the proceedings are not legitimate.

5. Article 15(4) of the Iraqi High Tribunal Statute encompasses command
responsibility.
Article 15(4) of the Iraqi High Tribunal Statute states that “[t]he crimes that were
committed by a subordinate do not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and the
superior failed to take the necessary and appropriate measures to prevent such acts or to submit
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the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”4 This is considered the
standard language for a provision of command responsibility, identical to those contained in the
Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, and SCSL.

6. Regardless of whether the IHT decides to apply JCE3, command
responsibility, or both, commanders of armed forces are not subject to war
crimes charges for their rolesin pursuing a war unless by omission they fail
to prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates or unless they opt to
participate in a common criminal plan.
Pursuing war is not in and of itself a war crime. The Geneva Conventions were created
in order to define the rules of war. Only when these war time regulations are not adhered to,
does the act of war become criminal. A commander need not worry that simply by participating
in a war, he is guilty of war crimes. He is still protected by the requirements of the doctrine of
command responsibility. He need be concerned only if he has entered into a common criminal
plan. A commander who adheres to the laws of war need not fear the theory of JCE3. Each
commander is expected to enforce the laws of war as a vital aspect of his “effective control” over
his subordinates. The position of being a high ranking member of the armed forces is in no way
a crime in and of itself.
If a commander does not prevent or punish crimes of his subordinates, including but not
limited to rape of civilians, the commander could be prosecuted under command responsibility.
However, JCE3 would not apply in a situation like this because JCE “culpability implies
personal conduct which finds expression in individual contributions to the enterprise.”5
4

Iraqi High Tribunal Statute, Article 15(4) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab1].

55

Ambos, Kai, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 1 J. Int’l. Crim. Jus. 25
(2007) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 43].
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
War crimes tribunals were created in order to punish those who “orchestrated crimes of
such magnitude as to attract international concern” as opposed to those who carried out the
crimes.6 The U.N. Security Council endorsed the policy that “civilian, military and paramilitary
leaders should be tried before [the Tribunals] in preference to minor actors.”7 The jurisdiction of
international tribunals is often over those most responsible for the heinous crimes of war and
against humanity. The experience of the tribunals has illustrated the difficulty in prosecuting
those who, despite the fact that they induced, ordered or planned mass atrocities, may have
stayed great distances from the actual commission of the crimes. The Kordic Trial Chamber of
the ICTY stated that “a superior who orders the killing of a civilian may be held responsible . . .
as might a political leader who plans that certain civilians or groups of civilians should be
executed, and passes these instructions on to a military commander.”8 Thus, prosecutors have
indicted leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Radislav Krstic,
Clemen Kayishema, Charles Taylor, and Samuel Hinga Norman for formulating or endorsing
criminal plans even though their subordinates in fact carried out the crimes in question.9

6

John R.W.D. Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 125 (2d ed. 2000) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 6 at Tab
58].

7

S.C. Res. 1329 (Nov. 30, 2000) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 12].

8

Prosecutor v. Kordic et al., Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 26 Feb. 2001, para. 373
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 20].
9

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,
16 June 2004, para. 140 (Prosecution accused former Serb leader Milosevic of participating in a
joint criminal enterprise to destroy Bosnian Muslims as a group) [reproduced in accompanying
Notebook at Tab 29]; Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18R61, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11
July 1996, para. 86 (found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the former Serb
14

Former ICTY Judge Antonio Cassese expressed the opinion that “bringing such culprits
to justice not only establishes individual responsibility and exonerates the rest of the population
from guilt, but it also dissipates the call for revenge, helps victims find reconciliation because
they know their tormentors have paid for their crimes, and establishes a fully reliable record of
the atrocities so future generations can remember and be made fully cognizant of what
happened.”10

These have been the goals of all the international criminal tribunals, beginning

with the Nuremberg Trials and extending today to Cambodia and beyond.11
Certain aspects of each international tribunal have been criticized since their inception.

leaders planned and ordered genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes or, at the very
least, did not prevent or punish them) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 19];
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 237-239 (the
Appeals Chamber overturned Bosnian Serb General Krstic’s conviction as a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise to commit genocide but upheld that he willingly participated in the joint
criminal enterprise to forcibly transfer Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of
Srebrenica, which amounted to persecution, a crime against humanity) [reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 4 at Tab 25]; The Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., Case No. ICTR-95-1T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 567-568 (the former prefect was convicted on four counts of
genocide for ordering and participating in four massacres that resulted in the deaths of thousands
of ethnic Tutsis in 1994, upheld on appeal) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 33];
The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Indictment, 7 Mar. 2003,
para.23-25 (charged the former President of the Republic of Liberia with participation in a joint
criminal enterprise to gain political power and control over Sierra Leone and its diamond mines,
resulting in unlawful killings, abductions, forced labor, physical and sexual violence, and other
crimes) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 38]; The Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga
Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, 5 Feb. 2004, para. 19 (charged the former
National Coordinator of the CDF with the participating in the common plan to use any means
necessary to defeat the RUF/AFRC forces and to gain and exercise control over the territory of
Sierra Leone, which led, inter alia, to unlawful killings, looting, terrorizing civilians, destruction
of private property, and use of child soldiers) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab
36].
10

Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (Jan.
199) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 6 at Tab 50].

11

Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial
Since Nuremberg (1997) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 6 at Tab 57].
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International law is itself an evolving mode of legal interpretation. Confusion is bound to arise.
This memorandum will discuss the situation that has arisen between differing forms of individual
criminal responsibility and the ways that these doctrines interact.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise
1. Joint criminal enterprisetheory was developedprior to the creation of the
Iraqi High Tribunal.
The terminology for judging joint criminal enterprise (JCE) was created by the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case of
Prosecutor v. Tadic.12 The Chamber felt the need for a doctrine that dealt with the widespread
and systematic planning of war crimes and crimes against humanity. So often, those who act as
the impetus for such crimes ultimately become barely connectible to the final act. The theory of
JCE rests on the idea that a group of criminals act “in the pursuance of a common criminal
design”13 and therefore, regardless ofeach individual’s role in the common design, all are
responsible for all of the crimes.
The case of the Prosecutor v. Tadic was the first case before the ICTY. Dusko Tadic was
a café owner and local politician.14 He was convicted for the persecution, beatings, and abuse of

12

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 181, 188
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 16].
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Prosecutor v. Kordic et al., Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 26 Feb. 2001.
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 20].

14

Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 12 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 16].
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non-Serbs as part of a Serbian “ethnic cleansing” policy.15 However, he was acquitted of the
murder of five men in the village of Jaskici due to the fact that the Prosecutor could not come up
with any evidence to establish that he was personally responsible for executing them.16 The
Prosecutor appealed the acquittal and the Appeals Chamber reversed.17
The Appeals Chamber explained that Tadic “actively took part in the common criminal
purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population” and therefore, it was foreseeable
that non-Serbs would be killed. In addition, the Appeals Chamber declared that Tadic had
willingly taken on the risk that the actions of his group would lead to such killings.18 Thus,
Tadic’s role in the common criminal plan of “ethnic cleansing” made him liable for the murders,
even if he did not kill the men himself. The judges established that liability from participation in
a “common purpose” which the judges felt was implicit in the ICTY Statute.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber conceded that liability for participation in a common plan
was not one of the Statute’s enumerated five forms of direct responsibility, but the Statute did
not exclude it, either.19 It explained that the grave nature of international war crimes justified
this interpretation:
Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal
act (murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.),
15

Jones, supra note 6, at 4-5. [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 6 at Tab 58].
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Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy
Law in International Tribunals, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 30, 39 (Nov. 2003) [reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 6 at Tab 49].
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 12 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 16].
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Id., para. 231-233.
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Id., para. 190.
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the participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital
in facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral
gravity of such participation is often no less – or indeed no different – from that of
those actually carrying out the acts in question.20

The Tadic Appeals Chamber essentially articulated a new theory of individual criminal
responsibility not defined by the ICTY Statute, so it devoted a substantial part of its written
decision toclarify the contours of the doctrine. First, it concluded that “broadly speaking, the
notion of common purpose encompasses three distinct categories of collective criminality,”
basing its analysis on an extensive scrutiny of post-World War II war crimes case law involving
complicit liability.21
A collective criminal enterprise is defined as a common agreement or understanding to
commit certain criminal acts for an ultimately criminal objective or goal. For example, for those
participating in the joint criminal enterprise of genocide, the ultimate destruction of a specifically
targeted group is the objective of all involved. Not everyone in the enterprise has the same role,
but together their efforts add up to an overall goal. Therefore, the theory of joint criminal
enterprise is one of collective responsibility placed on one member of a larger group. This
theory developed from the earlier doctrine of conspiracy and from the Nuremberg theory of

20

Id., para. 191.
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Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 12, para. 195 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2
at Tab 16]; see also Christopher J. Knezevic, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
International War Crimes Research Lab: Joint Criminal Enterprise – What is the Degree of
Participation Required for Conviction? An Exhaustive Memo of the Jurisprudence on Joint
Criminal Enterprise, at 10-18, available at http://law.case.edu/War-Crimes-ResearchPortal/memoranda/Cknezevic.pdf (Spring 2004) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 6 at
Tab 62].
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organizational liability. The core of JCE liability is membership/participation in a group that is
pursuing a criminal enterprise.22
The ICTY Appeals Chamber laid a foundation for three separate categories of collective
criminality, commonly referred to as JCE1 or I, JCE2 or II, and JCE3 or III (also referred to as
Extended JCE). The basic form of JCE, JCE1, consists of participants acting on the basis of a
“common design” or “common enterprise” and with a common “intention.” JCE2 is the
systemic form of JCE where, for example, in the so-called concentration camp cases, crimes are
committed by members of military or administrative units such as those running concentration or
detention camps on the basis of a common plan. Finally, JCE3 occurs when one of the coperpetrators actually engages in acts going beyond the common plan but his or her acts still
constitute a “natural and foreseeable consequence” of the realization of the original criminal
plan.23
Three elements are required for each of the different versions of JCE; a plurality of
persons, the existence of a common criminal plan, and the participation of the accused in the JCE
by “any form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common purpose.”24 Each
category of JCE has additional requirements specific to it. JCE1 requires that the co-perpetrators
share intent, while JCE2 requires that the perpetrator have personal knowledge, not necessarily a
shared intent, of the system of ill-treatment. JCE3 requires that the perpetrator have the intention
22

E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violation of International
Humanitarian Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2003), at 195 [reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 5 at Tab 42].
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to participate in the criminal purpose and to contribute to the commission of a crime by a group
and that “responsibility for a crime that was not part of the common purpose arises if the
commission of the crime was foreseeable and the accused willingly took that risk.”25
JCE3 assumes some level of participation by the defendant in the initial enterprise, and
the criminality of the enterprise. It follows that all members of a criminal enterprise are held
accountable for each other’s crimes. JCE3 is very similar in this respect to the doctrine of
Felony Murder. If two criminals work together for the common goal of robbing a bank, the one
who drives the getaway car is equally guilty of murder, if the other criminal shoots and kills
someone while inside the bank. Once a common objective has been agreed upon, regardless of
each criminal’s specific role, everyone who participated in the enterprise is guilty of all crimes
committed within the larger objective. This is true even if the acts perpetrated by one were not
agreed upon by the whole group. When someone robs a bank with a gun, it is foreseeable that
someone could get shot. The driver of the getaway car has willingly taken that risk and
therefore, accepts the responsibility for the actions of the person who actually goes into the bank.
The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia offered its own illustration
of what it means to be charged with JCE3. There must exist
a common, shared intention on the part of a group to forcibly remove members of
one ethnicity from their town, village or region . . . with the consequence that, in
the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and killed. While
murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common
design, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at
gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one or more of these civilians.26
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Tadic, supra note 12,(emphasis added)[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 16].
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The Appeals Chamber went on to state that in addition to the predictable and foreseeable
consequences of any given common plan, the accused needed to be “reckless or indifferent” to
the risk of these consequences, therefore, accepting the risk of such an outcome. This “dolus
eventualis” or “advertent recklessness” mens rea standard has been criticized, but JCE3 has also
been widely and successfully charged in cases against individuals with the highest levels of
authority when other forms of liability have failed.
JCE has become one of the most important tools of liability at the ICTY.27 Eighty-one
per cent of all indictments between June 25, 2001 and January 1, 2004 at the ICTY based
liability on this doctrine.28 Prosecutors at the SCSL are following the ICTY’s example in using
JCE to hold defendants liable. The key leaders of the three groups that were involved in the
armed conflict in Sierra Leone have all been charged with participating in joint criminal
enterprises to gain control over the territory and its diamond mines.29
27

J.S. Martinez and A.M. Danner, Guilty by Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 California Law Review
(2005) 75, at 102-120 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 47].
28
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incorporated JCE.) See also Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of the Most Significant
Achievements of the ICTY, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 903, 910-11 (Spring 2003) (“In the last two
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The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, supra note 9, para. 23-25 (charged the former
President of the Republic of Liberia and other AFRC leaders with participating in a joint
criminal enterprise to gain political power and control over Sierra Leone and its diamond mines,
resulting in unlawful killings, abductions, forced labor, physical and sexual violence, and other
crimes); The Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman et al., supra note 9, para. 19 (charged former
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2. Article 15(2)(D) of the IHT Statute encompasses Joint Criminal Enterprise.

Article 15(2)(D) of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IHT”) Statute provides that liability arises
if the individual “[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either: (i.) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the voluntary commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or (ii.) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit the crime.”30
It follows from this provision that an individual who in any way contributes to the
commission of a crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction can be held criminally responsible and
liable for punishment, even if he does not perpetrate the crime himself. Since Article 15(2)(D)
of the IHT Statute explicitly provides for common purpose liability, it follows that it also
encompasses joint criminal enterprise, since common criminal purpose and joint criminal
enterprise are equivalent theories of liability (see discussion supra note 21 and accompanying
text). As long as the original enterprise is not criminal, which a war that adheres to the Laws of
War is not, then commanders need not fear charges of JCE3. Common criminal purpose is
destruction of private property, and use of child soldiers); The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay
et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT, Amended Consolidated Indictment, 13 May 2004, para. 3638 (charged the former RUF leaders with participating in a joint criminal enterprise to gain and
exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone and its natural resources,
particularly the diamonds, which led to unlawful killings, abductions, forced labor, physical and
sexual violence, use of child soldiers, and other crimes). [Sesay is reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 5 at Tab 37] [Taylor is reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 38] [Norman
is reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 39]
30

The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 2 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook
1 at Tab 1].
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equivalent to a Joint Criminal Enterprise, which any war, on its face, is not. Any war in which
the Laws of War are applied with a good faith effort by all commanders is not in and of itself a
crime and would not subject law-abiding commanders to JCE liability.

3. The specific wording of Article 15(2)(D) differs considerably from the
parallel JCE provisions of the other international tribunals.
Article 15(2)(D) of the IHT Statute is identical to Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and differs textually from the provisions used at the
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL to impose joint criminal enterprise liability.

Article 15 explicitly

provides for common purpose liability, whereas the other courts have had to interpret, in their
decisions and judgments, that common purpose liability is implied in their statutes (see
discussion supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text).
As opposed to the other international tribunals who must rely on the judge-made doctrine
and its contours, the IHT Statute explicitly spells out the mental states necessary to incur liability
for crimes committed by persons acting with a common purpose. However, the IHT mens rea
requirements are not the same as those set forth in the jurisprudence of the other tribunals.
According to one expert, the ICC provision (and thus the IHT provision, since they are identical)
“‘repairs’ the technical defaults of complicity liability, which has caused some misunderstanding
and resulted in creative law-making at the ad hoc Tribunals.”31
In contrast to the Statutes of the other international tribunals, IHT Article 15(2)(D)
contains specific language regarding common purpose.32 In the other three tribunals, the judges

31

E. van Sliedregt, supra note 22 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 42].
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See Iraqi Statute, supra note 2, Art. 15 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 1].
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have held that common purpose (joint criminal enterprise) is implied by the statutes.
Specifically, the IHT Statute explicitly defines the requisite mental state for crimes committed by
persons acting with a common purpose. This mens rea is knowledge. In finding JCE implicit in
the Statutes of the other tribunals, the Tadic Appeals Chamber assigned different mens rea
requirements to different types of JCE.33

4. Certain requirements of Article 15(2)(D) seem to exclude the use of JCE3,
and therefore, prosecutors could not rely on the IHT Statute as the basis for
including JCE3 in their indictments.
The IHT Statute explicitly requires that for common purpose liability, the accused must
know of the group’s intention to commit a crime. This is a higher mens rea requirement than that
required for JCE in the jurisprudence of the other tribunals. While this higher requirement
seems to continue to allow the IHT to prosecute individuals using the first two categories of JCE
liability, it also seems to preclude use of the third category, known as the Extended JCE, since
under JCE3 one member of the enterprise need not have known about the other members’
criminal intent as long as 1) the original criminal plan was a common enterprise and 2) the
crimes committed outside of that original criminal plan were foreseeable.
Article 15 of the IHT Statute is identical to Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. Some scholars have pointed out that the Rome Statute leaves no
room for JCE3 to be utilized.34 Article 15(2)(D) of the IHT Statute states that an accused must
“know” of the group’s intention to commit a crime in order to be held accountable for it. The
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typical mens rea requirement for JCE3 is foreseeability, not knowledge.

Article 15(2)(D)

eliminates the advertent recklessness mental state used with defendants in cases at the ICTY
where the accused participated in the enterprise in spite of the risk that additional crimes outside
the original scope of the enterprise were foreseeable. Thus, the explicit mens rea requirement
precludes the charge of JCE3 based on the IHT Statute.
Article 15(2)(D) does allow for the use of JCE1 and JCE2 as forms of liability. Article
15(2)(D) sets the lowest possible standard of actus reus to hold perpetrators in a common plan
criminally responsible, penalizing a member of a group for the crimes of other members as long
as they contributed to the common plan in some way.

5. Even if Article 15 of the IHT Statute does not provide for JCE3, the IHT
may allow charges of JCE3 based on the jurisprudence of other international
courts which have found JCE3 to be customary international law.

The IHT may choose to apply the jurisprudence of the other international tribunals, which
allow for JCE3, because that jurisprudence reflects general legal principles and customary
international law. By opting to follow the jurisprudence, rather than being limited by its Statute,
the IHT would be choosing to use any means possible to hold the most blameworthy criminal
masterminds liable for atrocities from which they are physically far removed. The IHT would
also be maintaining consistency among the international criminal law courts. However, utilizing
JCE3 almost certainly deviates from the IHT Statute, which might give strength to the argument
that the proceedings are not legitimate. JCE3 has been incredibly successful at the ICTY and it
might prevent the IHT from prosecuting as successfully as possible.
The ICTY “saw no explicit basis for participation through JCE” in the articles of its
Statute, however, “it found an implicit basis in the term ‘committed.’ Since “the commission of
25

crimes … might also occur through participation in the realization of a common design or
purpose,” 35 the Court found that their Statute included all modes of participation. The wording
of the IHT Statute expressly authorizes prosecutors to charge defendants before the Tribunal
with common purpose liability, so the IHT will not have to endure the criticism that the other
tribunals faced about whether it is fair to use judge-made doctrine to hold defendants criminally
liable. Express statutory authorization to employ common purpose liability promotes the
legitimacy of its use in IHT proceedings.
As noted above, the IHT Statute allows for the use of JCE1 and JCE2, but not JCE3.
However, it is arguable that all forms of JCE have become theories of customary international
law and that JCE3 is therefore an available tool despite the wording of the Statute. The Tadic
Appeals Chamber was not authorized by statute to apply JCE as a form of criminal
responsibility, and so it had to justify the theory by finding that it existed as customary
international law in 1992 at the time of the alleged crimes which Tadic was accused of
participating in. Almost a decade has passed since the Tadic Appeals Chamber holding, and an
extensive body of subsequent case law now supports the notion that joint criminal enterprise is
part of customary international law from 1992 onward.
By overcoming the apparent statutory preclusion of JCE3 through reliance on the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and the general legal principles and customary international
law they represent,36 the IHT would accomplish several important objectives. By utilizing the
theory of JCE3, the IHT would be able to hold masterminds of heinous atrocities criminally
liable for acts carried out in circumstances from which they were far removed. Also, by adhering
35

Ambos, Kai, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, supra note 5
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 43].
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Van Sliedgret, supra note 2, at 107 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 42].
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to the precedent of the ICTY, the IHTwould prevent the development of two diverging bodies of
international criminal law.37 Finally, by following the established jurisprudence of the other
tribunals, the IHT would be signaling to the international community that it has an interest in
upholding the pre-established principles of international law. This would improve the argument
that the IHT is as legitimate as any other international proceeding.38
It is important, however, that despite the positive aspects of following JCE3 precedent, it
is duly noted that a “[d]eviation from adherence to strict principles may augment the chances of
conviction but it can also threaten the Tribunal’s ability to fulfill its solemn goals.”39 If JCE3 is
truly not contained in the IHT Statute, using it anyway might add fuel to the fire of those
criticizing the IHT for its lack of legitimacy.

B. Theory of Command Responsibility
The principle of command responsibility declares that the “fact that any of the [illegal]
acts . . . was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or
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William A. Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 1015, 1015 (Summer 2003) [reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 6 at Tab 54].
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to punish the perpetrators thereof.”40 This original theory of command responsibility can be
traced back at least to the Hague Conventions of 1907.41
The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (“Protocol I”) addressed
command responsibility but phrased it a bit differently. Protocol Istates that superiors are not
absolved of criminal responsibility for breaches committed by their subordinates, if “they knew
or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time,
that [the subordinate] was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.”42
Liability under the theory of command responsibility has three requirements. The first
requirement is that there exists a superior-subordinate relationship. The second is that the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts of his
subordinates or punish them for those actions. The third requirement is that the superior knew or
had reason to know that a criminal act was about to be committed or had been committed.43 In
many ICTY judgments, the Court emphasized that implicit in the first requirement is the
necessity that the superior actually have the ability to exercise control over his subordinates.
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ICTY Statute art. 7(1); ICTR Statute art. 6(1) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab
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Annex to 1907 Hague Convention IV, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
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Notebook 2 at Tab 13].
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Judgment, Delalic et al. (IT-96-21), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, § 346 [reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 15].
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Therefore, the ICTY has stated that a superior’s control over his subordinates must be
“effective”44 in order to hold him responsible for the subordinate’s crimes. The level of effective
control illustrates the superior’s duty to act in situations where crimes need to either be prevented
or punished. The ICC Statute goes as far as requiring that the crime was “caused” or allowed to
occur because of the superiors failure to either prevent or punish.45 Commanders are given a
high level of responsibility to assure that their subordinates are not violating international
humanitarian law, either with direct acts or with omissions.46
The U.S. Supreme Court explained the theory of command responsibility in its judgment
on the Yamashita habeas petition. “The law of war supposes that its violation is to be avoided
through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible
for their subordinates.”47 In addition, the Court stated that a military commander has “an
affirmative duty to take such measures as are within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian populations.”48

C. The Relationship between Command Responsibility and Joint Criminal
Enterprise and the lessons learned from the case of Prosecutor v. Krstic.
JCE and command responsibility are two kinds of individual responsibility. These two
different theories give prosecutors thepossibility of charging a defendant based on differentkinds
44
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of available evidence. If a superior-subordinate relationship cannot be established, a charge of
JCE is another option in cases where a commander is in no way the perpetrator of a crime but
can in fact be held accountable for the actions of his troops.
After the ICTY Appeals Chamber articulated the theory of JCE, many prosecutors opted
to charge defendants both with crimes based on a form of JCE and with crimes based on
command responsibility. In the case of Prosecutor v. Krstic, the defendant was charged under
both the theory of command responsibility and that of JCE. Based on the evidence available, the
the Court found that his responsibility under JCE “subsumed” his responsibility based on
command responsibility and therefore, only the charge of JCE was sustained. This interpretation
of JCE’s ability to subsume command responsibility was reinforced in the case of the Prosecutor
v. Kvocka. The Court in Kvocka stated that where the legal requirements of both theories are
met, a conviction should be based on JCE only, and the superior position should be taken into
account as an aggravating factor in sentencing.49 This approach has often simply saved the
ICTY time in proving the differing requirements of both command responsibility and JCE.
The trial of General Radislav Krstic was the first ICTY trial to try the charge of genocide
through to completion.50 When it began, General Krstic was the most senior military official to
stand trial at The Hague.51 The Trial Chamber, in a Judgment rendered after hearing more than
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110 witnesses, described what it labeled “nine days of hell” in Srebrenica.52 Despite the horrific
evidence of atrocities in Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber stated that “[t]his defendant, like all
others, deserves individualized consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented
in court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes covered
by the Statute of the Tribunal.”53
A brief set of facts about the case begins when units of the Bosnian Serb Army (“VRS”)
launched a 9-day attack on the village of Srebrenica, located in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The area
that was attacked was a designated as a U.N. safe area.54 Approximately 25,000 Bosnian
Muslims living in Srebrenica were abducted from their homes and taken on overcrowded buses
across conflict lines into Bosnian-Muslim held territory.55 The military-aged Bosnian Muslim
men of Srebrenica, however, were “taken prisoner, detained in brutal conditions and then
executed. More than 7,000 people were never seen again.”56 Facts later revealed that:
[t]housands . . . were slaughtered in ‘carefully orchestrated mass executions’ that
‘followed a well established pattern.’ The men were lined up in groups of ten,
blindfolded, wrists bound with wire ligatures, shoes removed and then shot.
Miraculously, a handful escaped to testify later at The Hague. Immediately
afterward and sometimes even during the execution, earth-moving equipment
52
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arrived and their bodies were buried. Months later they were reburied further
north in Serb-held territory to avoid discovery as the Dayton Accord negotiations
began.57

The area where these events took place fell within the zone of responsibility of the Drina
Corps, a formation of the VRS, a formation lead by Chief of Staff and Commander Krstic.58
Therefore, Prosecutors charged Krstic under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, the implicit JCE
provision, but they did not specify a form of direct responsibility.59

In spite of defense

arguments that joint criminal enterprise liability was therefore not available because it had not
been pled, the Trial Chamber found that the Indictment contained sufficient references to alleged
crimes committed in concert with others to allow it.60
For the first time in an international court, the defendant, Krstic, was charged under both
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute and the command responsibility provision of Article 7(3). The
command responsibility theory could hold Krstic criminally liable for crimes committed by his
troops if (1) he knew or should have known about the crimes, and (2) he did not take reasonable
and necessary steps to either prevent the crimes or punish his subordinates for their misdeeds.61
However, rather than find Krstic indirectly liable using command responsibility, the Trial
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Chamber wanted to hold Krstic directly responsible for the events at Srebrenica.62 The Court
found that “where a commander participates in the commission of the crime through his
subordinates, by ‘planning’, ‘instigating’ or ‘ordering’ the commission of the crime, any
responsibility under Article 7(3) is subsumed under Article 7(1).”63
The evidence established that Krstic had played a significant role in “organizing the
transportation of civilians, that he knew it was a forcible, not voluntary, transfer, and that he was
fully aware of the ongoing humanitarian crisis and mistreatment of civilians by VRS soldiers.”64
The Trial Chamber concluded that the facts compelled the inference that the political and/or
military leadership of the VRS formulated a plan to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslim
population from Srebrenica and that General Krstic was a key participant.65 This inference led
the Chamber to declare that the JCE actus reus requirements of plurality, a common plan, and
participation were established.66
The Chamber then turned its attention to the issue of Krstic’s mental state. The Chamber
examined “which crimes fell within and which fell outside the agreed object of the joint criminal
62

Danner & Martinez, supra note 27, at 144-45 (“[I]nternational criminal prosecutors appear to
be attempting to fit as many political and military leaders under the JCE framework in preference
to command responsibility liability, even in cases where the latter arguably better describes the
actions of the accused” perhaps for the psychological impact. JCE seems to carry more weight
and captures the seriousness of the leader’s responsibility for the violent course of events.)
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 5 at Tab 47].
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Krstic Trial Judgment, supra note 52, para. 605 (emphasis omitted) [reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 4 at Tab 25].
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enterprise to ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica enclave.”67 The Trial Chamber agreed that the
first object of the JCE was the forcible transfer and evacuation of the Muslim civilians out of
Srebrenica, and that Krstic’s extensive participation in it evidenced his intent for the crime.68
Krstic, having organized the large scale military operation which would accomplish this criminal
goal, was liable.69 The Trial Chamber then recognized that the murders, rapes, beatings and
abuses committed against the refugees by the VRS were not the original objective of the joint
criminal enterprise, but they were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the ethnic cleansing
campaign. Since the foreseability requirement was fulfilled with regard to the murders, rapes,
beatings, and abuses, the Chamber found Krstic liable for those crimes under JCE3.70
The plan to forcibly transfer Bosnian Muslims was a part of the larger common criminal
plan of the entire VRS to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica.71 The Trial Chamber found that killing
the men “became the object of the newly elevated joint criminal enterprise of General Mladic
and VRS Main Staff personnel” and that the killing was aimed at permanently eradicating the
Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica, a prime example of genocide.72
The Trial Chamber noted that Krstic fulfilled a keycoordinating role in the genocidal
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campaign at a stage when his participation was “clearly indispensable” in the killings.73 In view
of both his mens rea and actus reus, he was deemed a principal perpetrator of genocide and other
connected crimes.74

Some commentators suggested that the Tribunal’s ruling in Krstic might

dilute the Extended JCE mens rea requirement for the underlying crimes:75
An offender may be convicted of the most serious crimes, and sentenced
to lengthy terms in prison, on the basis of what can amount to a
negligence-like standard of guilt. General Krstic was convicted of
genocide and was sentenced to a term of 46 years in prison, all on the
basis of the JCE theory of criminal liability. The Trial Chamber never
really concluded that he actually intended to commit genocide—a
requirement of the Statute—but only that genocide was a “natural and
foreseeable” consequence of a criminal plan to ethnically cleanse
Srebrenica, and that a reasonable person would have “surmised” such a
development.76

The same commentator suggested that diluting the mens rea requirements could have farreaching implications for the trial of Slobodan Milosevic and beyond:
[I]f it cannot be established that the man who ruled Yugoslavia
throughout its decade of war did not actually intend to commit war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide, but only that he failed to supervise
his subordinates or joined with accomplices when a reasonable person
would have foreseen the types of atrocities they might commit . . . the
door is left ajar for future generations to deny the truth.77
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Schabas, supra note 39, at 1033-34, [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 6 at Tab 54]; see
also Danner & Martinez, supra note 27, at 108-09. (“[A]t least one ICTR Trial Chamber has
suggested that the accused may be responsible for crimes that were objectively foreseeable, even
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Krstic appealed his conviction, challenging, inter alia, the holding that he was criminally
responsible for the crimes that arose from his “individual participation in a joint criminal
enterprise to forcibly transfer civilians, and opposing the finding that he shared a genocidal intent
of a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide against the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica.”78
On the first challenge, the Appeals Chamber upheld the finding that the forcible eviction and
subsequent murders were a part of a joint criminal enterprise, and that Krstic participated in that
enterprise.79 It was unnecessary to establish that he was actually aware other criminal acts were
being committed, so the appeal against the second conviction was dismissed.80
Regarding the genocide conviction based on the theory of command responsibility, the
Appeals Chamber reviewed the evidence relied upon by the Trial Chamber to establish intent to
commit genocide and concluded the Trial Chamber’s assertion was without a proper evidentiary
basis— it established only that “Krstic was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of
some members of the VRS Main Staff, and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the
use of Drina Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings.”81 The Appeals Chamber
emphasized that convictions for genocide can be entered only where intent has been
unequivocally established, and knowledge alone could not support such an inference.82 The
Court then reassessed what level of responsibility the evidence did establish, and determined it
78
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was accurately characterized under Article 7(1) as that of an aider and abettor of genocide, not as
a perpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise.83 As a result, command responsibility has never again
been used as liability within a charge of genocide.
Ultimately, JCE3 and command responsibility differ in many ways. All three categories
of JCE require a “positive act or contribution to the enterprise.” However, command
responsibility requires less – only that a superior made an omission, either to prevent or to
punish.84 Command responsibility also requires a kind of vertical or hierarchical relationship
between those involved, while JCE typically involves a horizontal relationship between coperpetrators. Therefore, despite the Krstic and Kvocka approach of having the charge of JCE
absorb in some way the charge of command responsibility, JCE is not the same as command
responsibility and the two terms or charges cannot be used interchangeably.

D. Regardless of whether the IHT decides to apply JCE3, command responsibility,
or both, commanders of armed forces are not subject to war crimes charges for
their rolesin pursuing a war unless by omission they fail to prevent or punish the
crimes of their subordinates or unless they opt to participate in a common criminal
plan
Pursuing war is not in and of itself a war crime. The Geneva Conventions were created
in order to define the rules of war. Only when these war time regulations are not adhered to,
does the act of war become criminal. A commander need not worry that simply by participating
in a war, he is guilty of war crimes. He is still protected by the requirements of the doctrine of
command responsibility. He need be concerned only if he has entered into a common criminal
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plan. A commander who adheres to the laws of war need not fear the theory of JCE3. Each
commander is expected to enforce the laws of war as a vital aspect of his “effective control” over
his subordinates. The position of being a high ranking member of the armed forces is in no way
a crime in and of itself.
If a commander does not prevent or punish crimes of his subordinates, including but not
limited to rape of civilians, the commander could be prosecuted under command responsibility.
However, JCE3 would not apply in that situation because JCE “culpability implies personal
conduct which finds expression in individual contributions to the enterprise….”85
The case of Prosecutor v. Krstic illustrated the ways in which both command
responsibility and joint criminal enterprise can apply to the crimes of one man. Both modes of
liability might be applicable but they are in fact not interchangeable. Commanders need not fear
that JCE3 makes them strictly liable for all crimes committed during war. As the Appeals
Chamber for the ICTY clearly pointed out, each mode of liability has different requirements
which a prosecutor must prove in order for the charge to be successful.

V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal seems to exclude the use of
joint criminal enterprise 3 as a mode of liability, the IHT may still be able to successfully
prosecute defendants on this theory under customary international law. In any case, the theories
of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise are tools for prosecuting individuals who
are guilty of crimes, by participation or omission. Prosecutor v. Krstic illustrated the co-

85

Id.
38

existence of these two theories and the ways in which they differ in the international criminal
legal system.
The IHT has choices to make about how to proceed, based purely on their Statute or more
along the lines of ICTY jurisprudence. Their decision will affect their indictments but not the
liability, or lack thereof, for commanders of the armed forces. War is itself not a crime. Only
when a commander fails to lead or when he engages in a common criminal plan does he fall
within the confines of command responsibility or joint criminal enterprise.The IHT would be
well advised to follow the jurisprudence of the ICTY and its use of JCE3, implicit in the statute.
Consistency among the international courts will afford the IHT the strongest of indictments
against war criminals. Based on the precedent of Krstic, JCE and command responsibility are
separate theories of liability, with different requirements. This case, as well as others, illustrates
the fact that in order for a commander to be found guilty of war crimes under JCE3, he must
have participated in a common criminal plan from the outset.
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